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Abstract
Barriers to outsourcing that are being currently implemented in the US e⁄ectively
tax its companies who ￿export￿jobs through outsourcing. The objective is to raise do-
mestic employment. Given that many of the important international markets where the
US has a comparative advantage feature non-atomistic ￿rms, we evaluate the implica-
tions of such policies in an oligopolistic context. We ￿nd that while an outsourcing tax
favors domestic workers by causing ￿rms to switch to a greater use of domestic sources
(the substitution e⁄ect), the loss in international competitiveness has a negative vol-
ume e⁄ect (the output e⁄ect), which pulls in the other direction. First, we identify
the conditions that determine the relative strengths of these e⁄ects, which inform us
about the conditions under which such a tax achieves its stated objective. Next, we
consider the international policy interdependence that arises when a competing nation
also engages in such a policy. An interesting ￿nding is that even if a unilateral tax
by the US raises its employment, this may turn around in a Nash policy equilibrium,
where the competing nation abandons free trade and also engages in unilateral out-
sourcing policies. Finally, we extend the basic model to look at the e⁄ects of credit
shortage and product di⁄erentiation. Interesting ￿ndings are that both a credit crisis
(as in recent years) and increased product di⁄erentiation tend to worsen the employ-
ment e⁄ects of the outsourcing tax. The qualitative nature of our ￿ndings is similar
between Cournot and Bertrand competition, suggesting that our results are robust to
the mode of strategic behavior.
JEL Codes: F13
Keywords: Outsourcing Tax; Employment E⁄ects; Oligopolistic Competition; Product
Di⁄erentiation
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Global outsourcing has emerged as a major economic strategy for ￿rms in developed
nations in the face of global competition and rising domestic labor costs. This process has
been facilitated by a revolutionary transformation of information technology. In turn this
has bene￿ted developing nations like India, which has cheaper labor which is su¢ ciently
skilled to take advantage of such technologies. Software and service exports have grown at
a rapid pace. Tele and computer networking, and international time di⁄erences have made
virtual business a round-the-clock a⁄air.1 While this has led to signi￿cant productivity gains
in developed nations, it has also fueled debate on how this may impact their labor force.
While the substitution e⁄ect of hiring cheaper foreign labor is negative for US employment,
the total e⁄ect is ambiguous. This is because increased pro￿tability for US ￿rms (through
the e¢ ciencies achieved in production) allow them to expand operations, and this volume
e⁄ect raises domestic employment. The total e⁄ect of outsourcing can therefore be positive.
The recent global recession has hit US labor markets, among others, quite hard. While
national income has stabilized, unemployment is high, and perhaps is yet to peak. If the
economy follows the ￿jobless recovery￿path of some earlier recessions, it will take quite a
few years for unemployment to come down to more acceptable levels. The political realities
in these uncertain times call for employment generating policies until the fears of continuing
high levels of unemployment are alleviated. Recently, the US Senate has passed a bill that
would raise the visa fees for a⁄ected companies (ones with US sta⁄, who have more than
half of their US-based employees on H1-B or L-1 visas) by around $2000 per visa application
(see Sharma and Johnson, 2010). This bill is most relevant to the technology outsourcing
companies, and its objective is to incentivize these companies to hire more local workers.2
In a recent speech in Parma, Ohio, President Obama suggested that he would like to reform
tax codes in such a way that there is less incentive for US companies to outsource jobs
(see White House press release dated 9/8/2010, available at www.whitehouse.gov). Another
recent example of government opposition to outsourcing is Executive Order 2010-09S of
Governor Ted Strickland of Ohio, which bans the use of public funds for the purchase of
services provided o⁄shore. This order (available at http://governor.ohio.gov/) explicitly
1See Bhagwati et al. (2004) for a discussion of the evolution of di⁄erent types of outsourcing.
2For a comparison of the labor market e⁄ects of outsourcing and immigration, see Jones (2005).
2links the ban to the lack of employment opportunities due to the recent recession:
￿Ohio￿ s Economic Vitality Necessitates Constant Vigilance in State Job Creation E⁄orts.
State o¢ cials and employees must at all times remain passionately focused on initiatives
that will create and retain jobs in the United States in general and in Ohio, in particular,
and must do so especially during Ohio￿ s continuing e⁄orts to recover from the recent global
recession.￿
It is, however, not clear that these proposed policies will raise domestic employment.
Indeed, if the contractionary e⁄ect of such a barrier dominates the incentive e⁄ect to hire
local workers, domestic employment will fall. This is all the more plausible in the longer run,
when the companies have had a chance to adjust their production and location plans. Such
considerations call for a careful analytical discussion of the wisdom of these policies. Bearing
in mind that many of the outsourcing ￿rms are non-atomistic, strategic considerations are
also important. To capture this, we depart from some of the recent in￿ uential papers
like Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008) and Acemoglu and Autor (2010), which operate
in a competitive context. As will become evident, there is some similarity between our
framework and theirs￿in the modeling of production technology. Oligopolistic behavior in
our model, however, leads to a non-trivial departure because of at least two reasons. First,
by considering a non-atomistic framework, we capture the reality faced by many of the larger
outsourcing ￿rms like the technology giants Microsoft, Intel, Infosys etc. Second, in such an
environment, cost asymmetries between ￿rms are critically important in determining market
shares. In turn, this determines domestic employment. Thus, outsourcing policies that are
designed to generate domestic employment may end up being self-defeating if market share
transfer e⁄ects are large.3 We derive several other results which highlight the importance
of using an oligopolistic framework.4
The academic literature on outsourcing has expanded at a fast pace. Grossman and
Helpman (2005) and others discuss modus-operandi, contractual designs and consequences
of outsourcing and contrast the mechanism with foreign direct investment and other types
of foreign factor mobility. Kikuchi (2006) and Marjit (2007) discuss emergence of outsourc-
3For an analysis of the e⁄ects of cost asymmetries on market shares see Neary (1994) and Lahiri and
Ono (2004), among others.
4It is important to note that the empirical results pertaining to the e⁄ects of outsourcing on employment
are far from conclusive. A nice example is the contribution by Harrison and McMillan (2006) who ￿nd that
outsourcing raises (reduces) US employment if ￿rms are to perform signi￿cantly di⁄erent (similar) tasks in
foreign a¢ liates and at home.
3ing in separated time zones. Batra and Beladi (2010) provide a factor proportions model of
outsourcing, while Mitra and Ranjan (2010) consider the e⁄ects of outsourcing on unemploy-
ment generated by search frictions. Chen et al. (2004) and Zhao (2001) provide analyses of
outsourcing in oligopolistic contexts, but their focus is completely di⁄erent from ours. The
former paper analyzes strategic incentives to buy intermediate inputs provided by a foreign
￿rm, where the domestic and the foreign ￿rm compete oligopolistically in the ￿nal goods
market. On the other hand, Zhao (2001) focuses on the possibility that a vertically inte-
grated unionized ￿rm may want to outsource and move its production process horizontally,
so that it is able to hedge against disruptions caused by the domestic union.
Our production structure is somewhat similar to Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008).
It also draws from an earlier literature with contributions from Dornbusch, Fischer, and
Samuelson (1977), Sanyal (1983) and Marjit (1987), in that we model outsourcing in terms
of a continuum of stages of production. An important novelty of this paper is that we
embed this production technology in a tractable oligopolistic framework. Our analysis of
competing employment generating policies by two rival nations, is, to our knowledge, also
novel to the literature.
We highlight some of our ￿ndings below. We show that the relative e¢ ciency of the US
￿rm with respect to its foreign competitor as well as the degree of product di⁄erentiation
between US and foreign products dictate the strength of the substitution e⁄ect relative to the
contractionary employment e⁄ect of an outsourcing tax. We also consider the possibility that
foreign nations may be pursuing outsourcing policies to augment their domestic employment.
In an oligopolistic international market, this leads to outsourcing policies of the US to be
interdependent with those of foreign exporting nations (say EU). This interdependence is
characterized by the Nash equilibrium in employment maximizing outsourcing policies (taxes
or subsidies). Several interesting results emerge, including the possibility that although a
unilateral outsourcing tax of the US may raise employment if EU were to commit to free
trade, this may turn around if EU also intervenes.
Finally, the outsourcing policies need to be carefully analyzed in the light of the contin-
uing problems of the global economy. In particular, the fall in consumer demand and global
￿nancial tightening are a⁄ecting ￿rms￿decisions. In this context, our paper is one of the ￿rst
to establish a link between credit shortage and the employment e⁄ects of outsourcing taxes.
4We ￿nd that global ￿nancial tightening strengthens the output e⁄ect of the outsourcing tax,
thereby making it more likely to reduce domestic employment. Similar results are obtained
for a fall in consumer demand. Therefore, the current recessionary environment seems to
be a particularly bad time to impose barriers to outsourcing.
The rest of the paper is organized into ￿ve sections. Section 2 presents the basic homoge-
neous good Cournot model. Section 3 considers outsourcing by both exporting nations (say
US and EU) and the properties of Nash equilibrium in employment maximizing outsourcing
taxes. Section 4 considers cooperative outsourcing taxes. Section 5 extends the basic model
to consider capital costs, and product di⁄erentiation in the context of both Bertrand and
Cournot competition. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Basic Homogeneous Good Model
There are n symmetric US ￿rms engaged in Cournot competition with nE foreign ￿rms
from the EU, selling a homogeneous good in the global market. Labor is the only factor
of production. The EU ￿rms remain passive as far as outsourcing goes (we relax this
assumption in the next section), and needs ￿ workers per unit of output paying them a
wage wE. The US ￿rms are engaged in active outsourcing and require one unit of labor
to produce one unit of output. The production process is fragmented in stages indexed by
z 2 [0;1]. While a(z) is per unit labor requirement in the US to produce the z-th. stage, it
is a￿(z) in India.




;r0 > 0. (1)
In e⁄ect, we assume that the Indian workers have comparative advantage in earlier
stages of production. Wages in the US and India are w and w￿ , respectively. Barriers to
outsourcing are captured through a tax t on outsourcing, so that the e⁄ective Indian wage











A(1) = A￿(1) = 1. (4)
An implication of (4) above is that neither nations dominates the other in terms of overall
labor productivity. However, the relative productivity of the di⁄erent stages di⁄er such that
it is possible for a ￿rm to get higher productivity by carrying out some stages of production
in one of the nations, while carrying out the rest in the other. The cost minimizing allocation
of this production decision is similar to Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008) and described
below.5
The staging of the game is as follows. In stage 1, US ￿rms optimally choose outsourcing,
i.e. what fraction of the production process will be outsourced to India. In stage 2, they




) ~ z = ~ z(w;w￿;t). (5)
This equation represents the cost minimization decision of a ￿rm. Given r0(z) > 0,
it must be that 8z > ~ z, w
w￿(1+t) < r(z), implying that a US ￿rm can reduce its cost of
production by switching the process z from India to the US. The opposite is true when
w
w￿(1+t) > r(z). This is demonstrated in Figure 1. Therefore, z 2 [0; ~ z] is outsourced to
India and z 2 [~ z;1] is sourced locally. Hence, the constant marginal cost of a US ￿rm is
given by
~ c = w[1 ￿ A(~ z)] + w￿(1 + t)A￿(~ z). (6)
The constant marginal cost of a EU ￿rm is
cE = ￿wE. (7)
Let qi be the output of the i-th US ￿rm, and qE
j of the j-th EU ￿rm. We assume a simple
linear inverse demand function for the ￿nal good,









j ) = ￿ ￿ Q ￿ QE, (8)
5This decision is also similar to equation (2), page 585, of Dixit and Grossman (1982).
6where Q and QE are the aggregate US and EU output, respectively. The Nash-Cournot
￿rst order conditions for pro￿t maximization are:
p ￿ ~ c ￿ qi = 0, ) qi = q = p ￿ ~ c, (9a)
p ￿ cE ￿ qE
j = 0, ) qE
j = qE = p ￿ cE, and, (9b)
q ￿ qE = cE ￿ ~ c. (9c)
Standard calculations yield:
Q = nq = (
n
n + nE + 1
)[￿ ￿ (nE + 1)~ c + nEcE], (10a)
QE = nEqE = (
nE
n + nE + 1
)[￿ ￿ (n + 1)cE + n~ c]. (10b)
Proposition 1 An outsourcing tax will reduce US employment if and only if the substitution
e⁄ect of the tax is dominated by the negative output e⁄ect of the tax. The output e⁄ect is
more likely to dominate when: (i) the market size is smaller; (ii) there is a greater number
of EU ￿rms; and, (iii) the US and Indian technology are more di⁄erent.
Proof. Aggregate employment in the outsourced industry in the US is given by
L = [1 ￿ A(~ z)]Q )
@L
@t







The left hand side of the second inequality of (11) is the output e⁄ect on domestic
employment arising out of the impact of the tax on aggregate domestic output. If output
falls, domestic employment must also fall at a given ~ z. The right hand side captures the
substitution e⁄ect, where a higher tax will cause the home ￿rms to switch to a greater use
of domestic sources. The relative strength of these e⁄ects determines whether outsourcing





(1 + t)r0(~ z)
< 0. (12)









1 + n + nE )(1 + nE)w￿A￿. (14)




w￿(1 + t) >
a(~ z(:))r(~ z(:))[￿ ￿ ~ c(w;w￿;t)(1 + nE) + nEcE]
(1 + nE)[1 ￿ A(~ z(:))]A￿(~ z(:))r0(~ z(:))
. (15)
The subsections below discuss each of the cases and establish the numbered claims made in
the proposition above.
2.1 Market Size:
A fall in ￿, which captures the size of the market, does not a⁄ect ~ z. It reduces the right
hand side of (15) without a⁄ecting the left hand side, making it more likely to be satis￿ed.
One can expect that a global recession will decrease demand because of lower incomes (i.e.,
reduce ￿). On the other hand, the pressure on the government to raise employment is the
greatest in such times. If the government responds by raising the outsourcing tax, it is more
likely to be counterproductive.
2.2 Foreign Competition, Cost Asymmetry and Market Share Ef-
fects:
It is easy to show that when nE rises, the right hand side of (15) falls, making it more








[￿ ￿ ~ c + nE(cE ￿ ~ c)]
=
(1 + nE)(@~ c
@t)
[￿ ￿ ~ c + nE(q ￿ qE)]
. (16a)
The numerator of (16a) captures the scale e⁄ect of the outsourcing tax from a change in
the output, while the denominator the substitution e⁄ect (from foreign to domestic labor)
at a given output level. Under initial symmetry of costs (i.e., cE = ~ c), a rise in nE cannot
change the denominator of (16a). The numerator, however, rises making the scale e⁄ect
stronger, and thus raising the likelihood of an employment reduction (from an outsourcing
tax). The intuition is the following. First, notice that the tax pushes up ~ c (above cE) and










8Therefore, the total market share transfer due to this e⁄ect is: [nE(@~ c
@t)]. The larger the
number of foreign ￿rms, the greater is this transfer e⁄ect, resulting in a more substantial
domestic output reduction because of the tax. Under initial cost asymmetry, if foreign cost
is higher (i.e., if cE > ~ c), home ￿rms have proportionally larger market share at the initial
equilibrium. In turn, this implies the denominator of (16a) must rise with nE. But even in
this case, it is easy to show that the ratio in (16a) must rise as the numerator rises faster.
In summary, the cost raising e⁄ect of t and thus the transfer of market share gets magni￿ed
in the presence of a larger number of foreign ￿rms. This market share transfer e⁄ect favors
employment reduction (from an outsourcing tax) regardless of the pattern of initial cost
asymmetry.
2.3 Technology Di⁄erence Between the US and India:
Consider the possibility that the US and India have identical technology. In this case
a(z) = a￿(z) for all z, and r(z) ￿ 1. This situation is described in Figure 2. Clearly, no
interior solution can exist in this situation as long as US and Indian wage costs di⁄er. If
w=w￿(1 + t) > 1, all of the production is outsourced to India. Consider now two di⁄erent









r1(z) = r2(z) = 1, at z = ￿ z. (18)
US technology is closer to Indian technology in pro￿le 1 (compared to pro￿le 2) if:
j1 ￿ r1(z)j ￿ j1 ￿ r2(z)j, for all z. (19)
Figure 2 graphs ri(z) and shows that when w=w￿(1 + t) > 1, the equilibrium level of
outsourcing for pro￿le 1 (~ z1) must exceed that of pro￿le 2 (~ z2). Also, in the linear case, a
rise in the outsourcing tax must lead to a much sharper level of decline in outsourcing for
pro￿le 1 compared to pro￿le 2, because of the former￿ s greater elasticity.
Overall, the message here is that when US and Indian technologies di⁄er a lot, the r(z)
schedule in Figure 2 is likely to be relatively inelastic and therefore an outsourcing tax will
9more likely reduce employment. We should note that we have to temper this conclusion
because the elasticity of the r(z) scehdule is endogenous. The di⁄erent technology pro￿les
here are asscoiated in equilibrium with di⁄erent levels of z. Therefore, elasticity alone does
not allow us to make a de￿nitive statement about the direction of the employment e⁄ect of
an outsourcing tax.
3 Outsourcing By Both the US and EU and Nash Em-
ployment Maximizing Taxes
It is typical in the strategic trade policy literature for a government to focus on trade
policies that maximize the net rent earned by the nation. However, as we have discussed
earlier, the current political compulsions of reducing unemployment are pivotal. In this
context, it is reasonable to consider employment maximization as an objective of the gov-
ernment. To simplify the analysis and to avoid a boring taxonomy of cases, we focus on
the employment objective, rather than on a mix of di⁄erent objectives. It is, however, not
di¢ cult to extend this analysis to consider an objective function that is constituted of both
employment and of rents earned by the nation.6 We also extend the basic model to allow
for outsourcing done by the EU ￿rms and to consider outsourcing policy by the EU as well.
As will become evident below, the outsourcing policy choices of the US and EU are interde-
pendent. Consequently, we analyze the Nash outsourcing policy equilibrium that arises in
this context. Several interesting results are derived, which inform us about the qualitative
nature of outcomes that are associated with such a strategic equilibrium. As in the US case,
the production process is fragmented in stages indexed by zE 2 [0;1]. Let aE(zE) be the





, rE0 > 0. (20)
That is, we assume that the Indian workers have comparative advantage in earlier stages
6See Mukherjee and Suetrong (2009) for an interesting analysis of oligopolistic markets where a nation-
alized ￿rm￿ s objective is to maximize a combination of pro￿t and national welfare. Although we do not
pursue such modeling here, an analogous formulation could consider the government￿ s objective as a convex
combination of national rents and the employment level. The weight on employment could derive from
political economy considerations in an era of high unemployment and unequal distribution of assets among
the voting population. This will be the case if most voters are laborers without corresponding access to the
rents earned in the form of oligopolistic pro￿ts.













AE(1) = A￿E(1) = 1. (23)
Let wE and tE be the wage rate and the outsourcing tax rate of the EU, respectively.
Using the same staging of the game as before, cost minimization by EU ￿rms must imply
that zE 2 [0; ~ zE] will be outsourced to India and zE 2 [~ zE;1] will be sourced locally, where
wE
w￿(1 + tE)
= rE(~ zE) ) ~ zE = ~ zE(wE;w￿;tE) (24)
The constant marginal cost of a EU ￿rm is
cE = wE[1 ￿ AE(~ zE)] + w￿(1 + tE)A￿E(~ zE). (25)
The employment level in the EU is
LE = [1 ￿ AE(~ zE)]QE. (26)
Notice from equations (5) through (11), that while ~ z is independent of tE, the home
output Q is not, because cE is a⁄ected by changes in tE. Therefore, home employment L
is also a⁄ected by tE. Thus, the outsourcing taxes that seek to increase employment in the
EU and US are interdependent. We analyze this interdependence through the Nash assump-
tion. That is, the US assumes tE to be given when choosing its employment maximizing
outsourcing tax rate, and the EU behaves analogously. Formally, the ￿rst order conditions
of the choice of outsourcing tax for the two nations de￿ne their respective Nash reaction
functions as:
Lt(t;tE) = 0 ) t = t(tE); and, (27a)
LE
tE(t;tE) = 0 ) tE = tE(t). (27b)








Since the second order condition of the US outsourcing tax requires that Ltt < 07, the
sign of the US reaction function depends on LttE, where









n + nE + 1
> 0. (29)
Using (29) and recalling from (12) that @~ z
@t < 0, LttE must be positive. Therefore, the
US reaction function must be positively sloped. Similarly, the EU reaction function is also
positively sloped.
Proposition 2 At a symmetric Nash equilibrium with positive outsourcing taxes, the Nash
employment level exceeds the free trade level. In a symmetric subsidy equilibrium, the em-
ployment level may or may not exceed the free trade level.
Proof. Notice that the equation of an iso-employment curve for the US is:
L(t;tE) = ￿ L ) (
dtE
dt




Using (27a) in (30) it is clear that the slope of the iso-employment curve for the US is
zero on its reaction function. Further, using (29)
LtE = (1 ￿ A)QtE > 0: (31)
Using (30) and (31) we can show that evaluated on the US Nash reaction function:
(
d2tE




(32) implies that in the neighborhood of the US reaction function the US iso-employment
curves are convex. Also, (31) implies that L is monotonically increasing with tE for a given
t. Consider Figure 3. Let L0 be the US employment level at free trade, L1 the employment
level at its employment maximizing tax for tE = 0, and LN the employment level at the
Nash equilibrium. Then it is evident that:
LN > L1 > L0. (33)
7It can be shown that Ltt = Qta(~ z)~ zt[( 1￿A
A￿ )r￿2]￿Qa0(~ z)(~ zt)2￿Qa(~ z)~ ztt, where ~ ztt = ￿( ~ zt
1+t)[2￿ rr00
(r0)2 ].
A su¢ cient but not necessary set of conditions for Ltt < 0 is that r < 2A￿
1￿A, a0(~ z) ￿ 0, and r00 ￿ 0.
12Because of symmetry, the same ranking applies to the EU also. Now consider a symmetric
subsidy equilibrium in Figure 4. It is clear that in this case:
LN < L1, and, L0(not drawn) < L1. (34)
It is, however, not possible to compare LN and L0. While both must be lower than L1,
their ranking vis-￿-vis each other is ambiguous, in general.
Proposition 3 At an asymmetric Nash equilibrium, the US employment level may be lower
than that under free trade, but EU￿ s employment must exceed the free trade level.
Proof. Consider Figure 5, where the employment maximizing Nash equilibrium involves a
tax by the US and a subsidy by the EU. Let LE0, LE1and LEN be the EU employment
levels at free trade, at the EU employment maximixing tax for t = 0, and at the Nash
equilibrium, respectively. Then it is clear that:
LEN > LE1 > LE0. (35)
As it is drawn, the iso-employment curve L0 intersects the US reaction function northeast
of N, therefore
LN < L0. (36a)
Thus, it is possible that even with a positive unilateral employment maximizing out-
sourcing tax by the US, its employment may fall in a Nash equilibrium compared to the free
trade level. Of course, if the intersection is southwest of N, employment rises in the Nash
equilibrium.
Corollary 1 For a su¢ ciently large number of US ￿rms and for a given number of EU
￿rms, we get a tax-subsidy Nash equilibrium where US employment is lower than free trade,
while EU employment must rise.
Proof. It is easy to show that the US Nash reaction function is independent of the number of
US ￿rms n, because it raises the substitution and the output e⁄ects of t equiproportionately.
However, a larger n reduces the unilateral tax of the EU, thus shifting its reaction function
down. The result is that for su¢ ciently large values of n we get a Nash equilibrium to the
south-west of B in Figure 5, where the US employment falls below the free trade level. Of
course, EU employment must exceed its respective free trade level.
13Both proposition 3 and the corollary have very interesting policy implications. Proposi-
tion 3 shows that even if a unilateral outsourcing tax may raise employment, its imposition
in an interdependent world may be counterproductive. This is because the tax may lead to
a reaction by the EU which may abandon free trade and engage in its unilateral employment
maximizing policy. The result may be an unintended outcome (from the US perspective)
where although the EU gains employment, US loses relative to free trade. Furthermore, the
corollary shows that the more dominant the US is in terms of the number of ￿rms it has
in the market, the more likely it is that the outsourcing tax is counterproductive in a Nash
equilibrium.
4 Cooperative Employment Maximizing Taxes
It is useful to analyze the cooperative employment maximizing taxes as a benchmark
to compare the Nash taxes. Joint employment is:
LC(t;tE) = L(t;tE) + LE(t;tE). (37)
The cooperative ￿rst order conditions are:
LC
t (t;tE) = Lt(t;tE) + LE
t (t;tE) = 0, and, (38a)
LC
tE(t;tE) = LtE(t;tE) + LE
tE(t;tE) = 0. (38b)
Evaluating the marginal bene￿t of the US outsourcing tax at the Nash equilibrium (where
Lt = 0), we ￿nd:
LC
t (t;tE)jN = LE
t (t;tE) = (1 ￿ AE)QE
t > 0, because QE
t =
nnEw￿A￿(~ z)
n + nE + 1
> 0. (39)
Similar analysis suggests that LC
tE is also strictly positive at the Nash equilibrium. Under
symmetry, this must imply that the cooperative taxes exceed the Nash taxes. This is because
cooperative taxes internalize the positive spillover caused by one nation￿ s outsourcing tax
on the other nation.
Proposition 4 At a symmetric cooperative equilibrium, the tax levels must exceed the Nash
taxes. The employment levels of the two nations must be at least as large as the free trade
level and strictly larger than the Nash level.
14Proof. The proof of the ￿rst part of the proposition lies in the discussion above. Given
that free trade is always an option for the two nations when they come to a joint agreement,
by revealed preference the cooperative employment levels cannot be any less than the free
trade level. Finally, given that there is a strictly positive local gain (as shown in equation
39 above) from raising taxes above Nash taxes, the symmetric cooperative taxes must yield
higher employment compared to the Nash taxes.
In the symmetric case, the cooperative equilibrium lies northeast of the Nash equilibrium
on the 45 degree line in tax space. Thus, a small movement northeast along the 45 degree
line from the Nash equilibrium must raise employment. If the parameters are such that
the Nash equilibrium involves subsidies, while the cooperative equilibrium involves taxes,
the free trade outcome lies between the two, and therefore must be associated with higher
employment levels compared to Nash. This possibility was also discussed in the context
of proposition 2, and suggests that unilateral intervention may be counterproductive in an
interdependent world.
5 Some Extensions of the Basic Model
In previous sections we assumed that there are no capital costs so that production only
involves labor costs. We also assumed that products exported by the two nations are not
di⁄erentiatied and that ￿rms engage in Cournot competition. We relax these two assump-
tions below and analyze how our ￿ndings need to be quali￿ed. The reasons for looking at
these cases are the following. First, numerous surveys suggest that access to external capi-
tal is important for production because ￿rms often have to incur substantial costs including
payments to workers that cannot be funded out of their cash ￿ ow or accumulated reserves
(Chor and Manova (2009)). Hence, in the face of a global liquidity crunch, it is particularly
important to establish a link between credit shortage and the employment e⁄ects of out-
sourcing barriers. Secondly, it is clear that many major players in export markets produce
di⁄erentiated goods. For example, while both Boeing and Airbus produce airplanes and
compete in the commercial aircraft market, their products are not identical. Therefore, it
is useful to analyze how our results may extend to the case of product heterogeneity and
alternate modes of competition. Finally, for simplicity, we use the basic model of section
2, where only the US ￿rms engage in outsourcing.
155.1 Capital Costs:
Assume that the ￿rm obtains the capital for payments to workers from an outside
credit market. Let R, R￿, and RE denote the interest rate in the US, India and Europe
respectively. A global credit crunch will tend to raise the cost of capital for all ￿rms. The
following proposition addresses the e⁄ect of such a phenomenon on the employments e⁄ects
of an outsourcing tax.
Proposition 5 An equiproportionate rise in capital cost in all nations due to a global credit
shortage makes employment reduction due to an outsourcing tax by the US more likely.
Proof. We assume that initially R = R￿ = RE, which is followed by an equiproportionate
rise in these rates. Let ~ z0 denote the threshold stage of production, such that z 2 [0; ~ z0] is
outsourced to India and z 2 [~ z0;1] is sourced locally. If ~ z is the corresponding threshold
level where there is no capital cost (as in previous sections), then
r(~ z0) =
w(1 + R)




) ~ z0 = ~ z. (40)
(40) implies that the stages to be outsourced to India do not change when the interest
rates rise equiproportionately. The marginal costs of production in the US and EU are,
respectively,
~ c0 = [wf1 ￿ A(~ z)g + w￿(1 + t)A￿(~ z)](1 + R) = ~ c(1 + R), where,
~ c = wf1 ￿ A(~ z)g + w￿(1 + t)A￿(~ z), and, (41a)
cE
0
= ￿wE(1 + R) = cE(1 + R). (41b)
The aggregate US and EU output levels are, respectively,
Q0 = (
n
n + nE + 1







n + nE + 1
)[￿ ￿ (n + 1)cE
0
+ n~ c0]. (42b)




w￿(1 + t) >
a(~ z)r(~ z)[
￿
1+R ￿ (1 + nE)fw(1 ￿ A(~ z)) + w￿(1 + t)A￿(~ z)g + nE￿wE]
(1 + nE)[1 ￿ A(~ z)]A￿(~ z)r0(~ z)
. (43)
16An increase in R for all the nations has no e⁄ect on any of the terms in the above
expression other than the term
￿
1+R, which is reduced. This means that a rise in R makes
it more likely that a US outsourcing tax will reduce employment. The reason is that capital
costs have di⁄erent impacts on the substitution e⁄ect and the output e⁄ect of the outsourcing
tax. A global rise in the capital cost does not a⁄ect the stages outsourced, but the ￿rms￿
marginal production costs rise, thereby decreasing their output. As aggregate output is
reduced, the substitution e⁄ect of the outsourcing tax is smaller, while the negative output
e⁄ect gets magni￿ed. Hence, it is much more likely that an outsourcing tax will reduce
employment in such an environment.
5.2 Product Di⁄erentiation:
This subsection considers the case where the goods produced by the US and EU are not
homogeneous, but ordinary substitutes for each other. Also, for simplicity we assume that
one US ￿rm competes with one EU ￿rm in a third country market. This is represented by
the following direct demand functions for the two ￿rms, where superscripts denote nations
H (US) and E (Europe), respectively,
qH = ￿H ￿ pH + ￿pE, ￿H > 0, 0 ￿ ￿ < 1. (44a)
qE = ￿E ￿ pE + ￿pH, ￿E > 0. (44b)
The parameter ￿ is a measure of the degree of product di⁄erentiation (or substitutability).
When ￿ = 0, the goods are unrelated. As ￿ ! 1, the goods are close substitutes. Also, by
restricting ￿ to be less than unity we assume that the own-price e⁄ect on demand is stronger
than the cross-price e⁄ect. Notice that we also assume that the degree of substitutability







Production technology is assumed to be the same as in section 2, hence the US ￿rm and
the EU ￿rm still face constant marginal costs ~ c and cE, given by equations (6) and (7),
respectively.
Proposition 6 For di⁄erentiated products, an outsourcing tax is more likely to reduce em-
ployment for a higher degree of product di⁄erentiation, for both Cournot and Bertrand com-
petition. The qualitative e⁄ect of the demand and cost parameters on the employment e⁄ect
of the tax is similar between the two modes of competition.
17Proof. Under Nash-Bertrand competition, the ￿rst order conditions of the US ￿rm and the
EU ￿rm, and the respective Bertrand reaction functions are,
qH ￿ (pH ￿ ~ c) = 0 ) pH =













Using (45a) and (45b), and noting that L = [1 ￿ A(~ z)]qH, we get
@L
@t
< 0 i⁄ w￿(1 + t) >
a(~ z)r(~ z)[2￿H ￿ (2 ￿ ￿
2)~ c + ￿(￿E + cE)]
(2 ￿ ￿
2)[1 ￿ A(~ z(:))]A￿(~ z)r0(~ z)
. (46)
Noting that ~ z is independent of ￿, it is easy to show that the right-hand-side of (46) is
increasing in ￿, making the inequality more likely to be satis￿ed for lower values of ￿ (i.e.,
for more di⁄erentiated products). This completes the proof for Bertrand competition.
To analyze Nash-Cournot competition for di⁄erentiated products we invert the demand
functions given in (44a) and (44b).8 The inverse demand functions are,




















The Nash-Cournot reaction functions are implicitly de￿ned by the following ￿rst-order-
conditions:
pH ￿ ~ c ￿
qH
1 ￿ ￿
2 = 0. (48a)
pE ￿ cE ￿
qE
1 ￿ ￿
2 = 0. (48b)




w￿(1 + t) >
a(~ z)r(~ z)[(2 ￿ ￿
2)￿H ￿ 2(1 ￿ ￿
2)~ c + ￿(￿E + (1 ￿ ￿
2)cE)]
2(1 ￿ ￿
2)[1 ￿ A(~ z(:))]A￿(~ z)r0(~ z)
. (49)
It can be readily shown that like (46), the right-hand-side of (49) is increasing in ￿.
Therefore, the employment e⁄ect of an outsourcing tax is more likely to be negative for
lower values of ￿. Also, comparing the two equations it is easy to see that the e⁄ects of the
demand and cost parameters ￿j and cj (j = H;E) on the employment e⁄ect are similar
between price and quantity competition. This completes the proof for proposition 6.
8See Dastidar (1997) for a comparison of Cournot and Bertrand equlibria for the homogeneous good case.
Also, see a recent paper by Roy Chowdhury (2009).
18When ￿ is low, the US ￿rm is a near-monopoly. The own-e⁄ect of a cost increase on
domestic output is strong, meaning that the outsourcing tax will have a larger e⁄ect on
output and employment when products are more di⁄erentiated. This makes intuitive sense.
A near-monopoly has greater price setting power. Therefore, faced with a tax increase it
raises price to a greater degree (thereby reducing quantity more) compared to a ￿rm which
faces more international competition. This suggests that one should be more careful in
imposing barriers to outsourcing when international markets exhibit high degrees of product
di⁄erentiation between US and foreign ￿rms.
6 Conclusion
We have found several interesting results regarding the e⁄ects of outsourcing barriers
in oligopolistic international markets. First, we point out that in an international oligopoly,
while the substitution e⁄ect of a tax favors domestic employment, the output e⁄ect leads to
employment reduction. Thus, a priori, the net employment e⁄ect is ambiguous. Our analysis
identi￿es the conditions and the parameters which determine whether the employment e⁄ect
is positive or negative. Second, we build on this insight to consider unilateral employment
maximizing outsourcing taxes by both the US and the EU. Given the interdependence in
their policies, we analyze the Nash equilibrium in unilateral employment maximizing taxes.
While the US must gain employment relative to free trade in a symmetric Nash taxation
equilibrium, this result need not hold in a Nash subsidy equilibrium or under asymmetry.
We also ￿nd that the cooperative taxes must exceed the Nash taxes because they internalize
the positive employment spillovers caused by one nation on the other. We extend the basic
model considered in section 2 to consider credit shortage and product di⁄erentiation. We ￿nd
that global ￿nancial tightening strengthens the output e⁄ect of the outsourcing tax, thereby
making it more likely to reduce domestic employment. Finally, we ￿nd that regardless of
the mode of competition (Bertrand or Cournot), greater product di⁄erentiation worsens the
employment e⁄ects of an outsourcing tax.
All of the above results have interesting policy implications. For example, responding
to a global downturn (which reduces demand or raises the cost of credit) by raising the
outsourcing tax is likely to be counterproductive. Analogously, given that nations are in-
terdependent, policy paradoxes may arise. For example, even though an unilateral tax may
19raise employment, it may be counterproductive to use it because it may engender a strategic
response by other nations which engage in outsourcing, thereby leading to an undesirable
employment loss in the resulting strategic equilibrium. Finally, we should note an important
strength of this paper. The strategic trade theory literature often ￿nds that policy prescrip-
tions are not robust to the mode of competition. In contrast, our analysis demonstrates that
the qualitative nature of our ￿ndings do not change if ￿rms compete in prices (Bertrand)
rather than in quantities (Cournot).
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